In addition to the press conference conducted on Wednesday by Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), Specter released a lengthy statement regarding the results of his interview of former Pats employee Matt Walsh, and other observations regarding the Spygate situation.

The entire statement is right here.  Here are a few highlights:

First, Specter points out the ongoing ambiguity regarding the extent to which the taping was disclosed by the Patriots and/or the league when the matter first came to light in September 2007.  “Originally,” the statement reads, ”Commissioner Goodell said the taping was limited to late in the 2006 season and early in the 2007 season.  In his meeting with me on February 13, 2008, Goodell admitted the taping went back to 2000.  Until my meeting with Matt Walsh on May 13, 2008, the only taping we knew about took place from 2000 until 2002 and during the 2006 and 2007 seasons.”

Second, Specter shares more details about Walsh’s activities at the Rams’ walk-through practice prior to Super Bowl XXXVI.  “Walsh said [former receivers coach Brian] Daboll asked him specific questions about the Rams offense and Walsh told Daboll about Faulk’s lining up as a kick returner.  Walsh also told Daboll about Rams running backs ‘lining up in the flat.’  Walsh said Daboll then drew diagrams of the formations Walsh had described.”

Third, the statement outlines the lengths to which the Patriots went to avoid detection of the taping of defensive coaching signals.  “During at least one game, the January 27, 2002 AFC Championship game, Walsh was specifically instructed not to wear anything displaying a Patriots logo.  Walsh indicated he turned the Patriots sweatshirt he was wearing at the time inside-out.  Walsh was also given a generic credential instead of one that identified him as team personnel.”

Fourth, Specter shared previously undisclosed (to the general public) details information about how the videotaping of defensive coaching signals was used:  “Walsh was told by a former offensive player that a few days before the September 11, 2000 regular season game against Tampa Bay, he (the offensive player) was called into a meeting with Adams, Bill Belichick and Charlie Weis, then the offensive coordinator for the Patriots, during which it was explained how the Patriots would make use of the tapes.  The offensive player would memorize the signals and then watch for Tampa Bay’s defensive calls during the game.  He would then pass the plays along to Weis, who would give instructions to the quarterback on the field.  This process enabled the Patriots to go to a ‘no-huddle’ offensive, which would lock in the defense the opposing team had called from the sideline, preventing the defense from making any adjustments.  When Walsh asked whether the tape he had filmed was helpful, the offensive player said it had enabled the team to anticipate 75 percent of the plays being called by the opposing team.”

Fifth, Specter locked onto the red-herring notion that “offensive signals” were taped, too — even though there is no such thing as an “offensive signal,” and that the only thing taped in this regard (indications of grouping formations) are quickly decoded by advance scouts.

Sixth, Specter relies upon the nonsensical and inane rantings of ESPN’s Mark Schlereth in support of the notion that the tapes of the defensive coaching signals were used in the same game.  Specter’s own statement, as it relates to how the defensive signals were used, contradicts the notion that the Patriots would have been able to decipher the signals on the fly.  Moreover, Specter ignores the fact that Walsh said that the signals weren’t used later in the same game.

Seventh, as to the practice of taping teams whom the Pats weren’t scheduled to play again that year, the reality is that the Patriots clearly were establishing a database of coaching signals that could then be used when facing the same coaches in the future, whether with their current team or with a new team.

Eighth, and finally, Specter lays out his reasons for pursuing this matter:  “There is an unmistakable atmosphere of conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest between what is in the public’s interest and what is in the NFL’s interest.  The NFL has good reason to disclose as little as possible in its effort to convince the public that what was done wasn’t so bad, had no significant effect on the games and, in any event, has all been cleaned up.  Enormous financial interests are involved and the owners have a mutual self-interest in sticking together.  Evidence of winning by cheating would have the inevitable effect of undercutting public confidence in the game and reducing, perhaps drastically, attendance and TV revenues.

“The public interest is enormous.  Sports personalities are role models for all of us, especially youngsters.  If the Patriots can cheat, so can the college teams, so can the high school teams, so can the 6th grader taking a math examination.  The Congress has granted the NFL a most significant business advantage, an antitrust exemption, highly unusual in the commercial world.  That largesse can continue only if the NFL can prove itself worthy. Beyond the issues of role models and antitrust, America has a love affair with sports.  Professional football has topped all other sporting events in fan interest.  Americans have a right to be guaranteed that their favorite sport is honestly competitive.”

Reasonable minds might differ in this regard, but the antitrust exemption gives Congress an obvious interest in the manner in which the NFL conducts itself.  The problem for Specter, however, is that he’s still a lone voice shouting in the desert, with none of his colleagues joining in the quest to investigate the NFL.